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COMMENTS 
ATOMIC ENERGY-INDEMNITY LEGISLATION-ANDERSON AMEND-
MENTS TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY AcT OF 1954-The Anderson 
Amendments1 were enacted to encourage private industry to enter 
the atomic energy field by removing the risk of excessive liabilitfl 
for a major nuclear reactor disaster.3 Such a disaster could result 
in liability far in excess of available insurance coverage.4 The 
solution provided by the new legislation has three aspects: (1) 
After private financial protection, geared to the amount of avail-
able insurance, is obtained by a person licensed by the Atomic 
Energy Commission, 5 (2) the Commission will execute an agree-
ment6 to indemnify (not insure) the licensee and "any other 
person who may be liable for public liability" to the extent of 
$500 million. (3) When claims exceed this amount the fund is 
distributed pro rata among claimants, a reserve being set aside 
for claims arising from latent injuries. After the $500 million has 
thus been exhausted, no further recovery is possible, for the act 
cuts off the liability of the licensee at this point.7 
The adoption of an indemnity rather than an insurance8 
approach to this problem has at least three important effects. The 
first of these is that substantive problems of liability are unaffected 
and thus left to the various determinations of state courts.9 This 
1 P.L. 85-256, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (Sept. 2, 1957), 71 Stat. 576, 42 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 
1957) §2210, amending the Atomic '.Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. 
IV, 1957) §§2011 to 2281. Section references ·herein are to the 1954 act, as amended. See 
71 HARV. L. REV. 750 (1958). 
2 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. I (1957). 
3 AEC, TWENTY-SECOND SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1957). Some companies have flatly 
stated that they will not put their costly reactors into operation until adequate protec-
tion is available. See, e.g., 103 CoNG. REc. 9560 Guly 1, 1957). 
4 Conceivable damages from the worst possible disaster have been estimated at from 
$200 million to S7 billion, including 3400 fatalities and injuries to 43,000 or more. 103 
CONG. REc. 9560 Guly 1, 1957); and Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 53 (1956). The maximum amount 
of private insurance presently available from both .the stock and mutual pools is about 
S60 million. Butler, "Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Energy Hazard," 60 PUB. UTIL. 
FORT. 913 at 916 et seq. (1957). T•his figure is about four times the maximum coverage 
for a single risk ever before available. AEC TWENTY-SECOND SEMI-ANNUAL REI'ORT 44 
(1957). 
5 Section I 70(a). See notes 29 and 30 infra. 
6 Section 170( c). 
7 Section 170(e). 
8 This is contrasted with re-insurance or a compensation scheme. See ATOMIC INDUS· 
TRIAL FORUM, !NC., FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST ATOMIC HAZARDS 45, 47 (1957). 
9 For analysis of the substantive problems associated with nuclear risks, see Cable 
and Early, "Torts and the Atom: The Problem of Insurance," 45 KY. L. J. 3 (1956); 
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result does not necessarily follow from the decision to use an 
indemnity plan, as is demonstrated by the procedure employed 
on the European continent where indemnity is accompanied by 
the imposition of strict liability.10 It may well be, however, that 
state courts will impose liability without fault in the event of a 
nuclear reactor disaster, but this is not certain and holdings might 
vary.11 Moreover, the expensive problems of duplicative litigation 
are evident in the context of a burn-up that spreads radioactive 
material over a multi-state area, particularly if the law of the 
state where the injury occurs is applied, as appears likely under 
existing conflicts rules.12 These costs of litigation or settlement 
will be paid out of the limited funds available to meet liability 
claims with the necessary result that whenever claims reach the 
limit on aggregate liability, whatever is consumed in the process 
of litigation must reduce the amount available to compensate 
injured persons. 
A second impact of the indemnity approach is that Congress 
has kept the government out of the insurance business, a decision 
which avoids both practical13 and political problems.14 That the 
present solution cannot appropriately be characterized as insur-
ance is rather clear, for insurance connotes a scheme whereby 
Becker and Huard, "Tort Liability and the Atomic Energy Industry," 44 GEO. L. J. 58 
(1955); ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, !NC., FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST ATOMIC liAzARDs 
(1957); Mitchel, "Some Administrative and Legal Problems Related to the ·widespread 
Use of High Level Radiation Sources," THE EcoNOMIC.S OF NUCLEAR PoWER 397 (1957). 
It is quite likely that an entrepreneur will be exposed to liability without fault for 
engaging in an extrahazardous activity. PROSSER, TORTS 336 (1955), and sources cited 
above. Even under a test of fault the doctrine of res ipsa loquiter may, in effect, impose 
strict liability. Liability might also be founded on a theory of nuisance. Freedman, 
"Nuisance, Ultrahazardous Activities, and the Atomic Reactor," 30 TEMP. L. Q. 77 (1957). 
The fact that the activity is being carried on pursuant to a federal license may avert 
strict liability [PROSSER, TORTS 343-344 (1955)], and certain other defenses, e.g., proximate 
causation, contributory negligence and assumed risk might protect the operator. Sup-
pliers of parts might be held liable for furnishing a dangerous instrumentality. Moran 
v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., (3d Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 908. In regard to liability 
of government contractors, see 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS §29.4, p. 1618 (1956). 
10 See Belser, "The Present Position of Reactor Owners in Europe in Respect to 
Third Party Liability and Insurance," paper presented to the Atomic Industrial Forum, 
N.Y., Oct. 30, 1957; comment, 6 AM. J. COMP. L. 79 (1957). 
11 See note 9 supra. 
12 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., §94 (1949). Defendants may be sued where-
ever they can be served with process, subject to forum non conveniens considerations, id. 
at §11. 
13 The process of setting up additional governmental machinery to conduct insurance 
business would be expensive and unnecessary. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 169 (1956). 
14 This is anathema to the insurance industry, id. at 168, 169. 
754 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
premiums are collected on an actuarial basis to accumulate a 
reserve out of which claims may be paid. The modest fee111 im-
posed for the government indemnity is intended only to defray 
administrative costs and will not be used to accumulate any re-
serve.16 Moreover, the accumulation of such a reserve adequate 
to cover all nuclear risks would make premium costs prohibitive.17 
The third consideration, which would probably also apply 
even had an insurance plan been adopted, 18 is that Congress can 
nullify the indemnity by withdrawing its consent to be sued. 
While the indemnity agreements are contractual and Congress 
cannot repudiate its contractual obligations under the Fifth 
Amendment, 19 this limitation is not traversed when Congress 
simply refuses its consent to be sued.20 Moreover, the indemnity 
is in the nature of a gratuity which Congress is always free to 
repudiate.21 The significance of this consideration lies in the ex-
pectation that private insurance organizations will have accumu-
lated sufficient experience and reserves in the next ten years to 
assume the entire burden of carrying nuclear risks,22 and that 
Congress may therefore wish to withdraw from this area. It was 
for this reason that the authority of the Commission to enter in-
demnification agreements expires on August 1, 1967, although 
no limit is imposed on the duration of agreements23 it may make 
before that time. Since all persons covered by the act remain 
primarily liable, the effect of withdrawing the indemnity would 
be at least to expose them to the additional $500 million liability 
which the government would otherwise have paid. It appears that 
lCSSection 170(£) authorizes ,the Commission to collect a fee of $30 per year per 1000 
kilowatts of thermal energy capacity for commercial licensees, and less in the Commis-
sion's discretion (based on prescribed criteria), no fee to be less than $100 per year. 
16 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity 
and Reactor Safety, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 14 (1956). 
17 Ibid. The yearly premium for the maximum coverage currently available under 
both pools is about $260,000. Butler, "Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Energy Hazard," 
60 PUB. Um.. FORT. 913 at 922 (1957). 
18 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). 
19 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
20 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), holding repeal of legislation under 
which individuals paid premiums to ithe government for war risk insurance could not 
validly repudiate such contract rights, but that Congress could nevertheless refuse to be 
sued on such claims. 
21 Brown, "Vested Rights and the Portal to Portal Act," 46 MICH. L. REv. 723 at 
736 (1948). But cf. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934), which distinguished 
pensions from insurance because an agreement of the parties is not involved. 
22 Hearings Before .the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 
84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 86 (1956). 
28 Section 170(c). 
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Congress could abolish even this limitation and restore full 
liability if it chose.24 
In light of these basic considerations the balance of this com-
ment will attempt to pose some of the problems facing the Atomic 
Energy Commission, nuclear entrepreneurs, and the public under 
the provisions of the new law. 
I. Coverage: Persons Indemnified 
The act's coverage is designed to supplement, rather than pro-
vide an alternative to private insurance.25 This reflects a policy of 
limiting coverage to cases where private insurance is unable to 
furnish protection in adequate amounts, and, generally,2is only 
those who have obtained all the private insurance available can 
make indemnity agreements. The extent to which reliance is 
placed on private coverage is illustrated by the language of sec-
tion 170(c) providing that the indemnity shall be for liability 
"in excess of the level of financial protection required." The 
committee report interprets this to mean that the government 
will not have to pay until claims exceed this amount even if the 
insurance company is not liable because of a "loophole" in its 
policy.27 This eventuality is unlikely, however, since the statute 
and the private policies have been drafted to track each other as 
closely as possible,28 so that generally speaking what is covered by 
one is also covered by the other. It does not take care of the prob-
lem presented by a breach of the insurance contract such as by 
failure to pay premiums. 
In addition to obtaining the necessary private financial pro-
tection, a person must make an indemnity agreement before he 
is covered by the act, although, as ·will be indicated below, the 
agreement covers persons other than the indemnitee. The ques-
tion who can make such agreements therefore becomes important. 
While the act requires an agreement of all facilities licensees,2Q 
24 CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1093 (1952). 
25 Hearings Before •the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 
84th Cong., 2d sess., p. I (1956). 
26 Section 170(b) authorizes the Commission to require a lesser amount. See below, 
"III. Financial Protection Required." 
27 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 21 (1957). 
28 Butler, "Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Energy Hazard," 60 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 
913 at 918 (1957); S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 16, 17 (1957). 
29 These are licenses issued pursuant to §§103 and 104, authorizing the ownership 
and operation of facilities for the production or utilization of special nuclear materials 
and §185 which authorizes construction of such a facility. 
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the Commission has the discretion to decide whether materials 
licensees30 must make agreements.31 If it decides that they need 
not, then they will normally31a not be covered. Indemnity agree-
ments are also available to AEC contractors whose activities in-
volve the risk of a substantial nuclear incident,32 but the con-
tractors, unlike licensees, are not required to furnish financial 
protection. 33 There are two basic reasons for this distinction. In 
the first place, it has been the practice of the Commission all 
along to make indemnity agreements with its contractors for 
nuclear risks.84 Secondly, the government would ultimately have 
to bear the cost of any insurance which it required its contractors 
to carry. Against this saving in government expense, however, 
must be balanced the better protection given the public by pri-
vate liability insurance than by the old government indemnity con-
tracts; for the private insurance policies do not except negligence 
or bad faith of the contractor from policy coverage as do the exist-
ing AEC indemnity contracts.35 Moreover, even when a contractor 
indemnified under the old arrangement chooses to make the $500 
million indemnity agreement, total coverage is less than if he 
had private insurance. This follows because his liability in all 
cases is limited to $500 million plus "the amount of financial 
protection required of the ... contractor."86 But since the old 
80 Licenses issued pursuant to §§53, 63 and 81, authorizing the possession and use 
of special nuclear, source and by-product material. 
31 Production, §ll(s), and utilization, §ll(y), facilities are defined .to include any 
equipment or device (excepting atomic weapons) capable of producing or using special 
nuclear material in such quantity or manner as to affect the health and safety of the 
public. Theoretically, then, mere materials licensees are less likely to pose a threat of 
catastrophic damage. The Commission is therefore given discretion in such cases so that 
financial protection will be required only when needed. However, no amount of by-
product material will automatically require a facilities license, so the Commission has 
complete discretion in this situation. 
Sla See text following note 39 infra. 
32 The term "substantial" is a translation of the distinction between facility and 
materials licensees, i.e., .to restrict coverage to the situations where there is likely to be 
large potential for damage. 103 CONG. REc. 9562 Guly I, 1957). 
83 The Commission is authorized to require financial protection but has decided 
not to do so. BNA, ATOMIC INDUSTRY REP. 4:29 (1958). The Commission has, nevertheless, 
offered the indemnity to its contractors, ibid. 
34 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 
84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 76-85 (1956). Prior to the 1957 amendments the only financial 
qualifications the AEC required of its licensees under §182 was the ability to meet the 
normal costs of operating the facility and paying for materials. Hearings Before the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 
107 (1956), IO C.F.R. 50.33 (Supp. 1957). 
85 Hearings -Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 
84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 76-85 (1956). 
86 Section I 70(e). 
1958] COMMENTS 757 
indemnity contracts do not appear to be "financial protection re-
quired" (since by hypothesis no financial protection is required 
of contractors) liability is limited to $500 million. This is less 
than coverage of the smallest licensee, since the $500 million is 
added to whatever financial protection the licensee furnishes.37 
The failure of the act to make clear the relationship between the 
two indemnities will undoubtedly raise other problems in the 
future. 
As was previously. suggested, an agreement once made covers 
many persons other than the indemnitee. The act provides that 
the AEC will contract to indemnify its licensees "and any other 
persons who may be liable."38 This provision was urged by con-
tractors and suppliers who might be liable in connection with a 
nuclear incident and was therefore intended primarily to cover 
such cases as the manufacturer of a defective rea,ctor part.39 The 
provision could also apply to a materials licensee who decided not 
to make an indemnity agreement himself. The Senate Report 
indicates, however, that the language also covers trespassers (e.g., 
an airplane which crashes into the reactor causing a nuclear in-
cident) and even saboteurs, so long as the sabotage does not con-
stitute an act of war.40 The reason given for including such 
persons is the desirability of protecting the public in these circum-
stances; and policy arguments can be made for covering the 
unfortunate owner of the airplane. It may nevertheless be ques-
tioned whether, in protecting the public against the deeds of a 
malicious trespasser, it is also necessary to indemnify that wrong-
doer and limit his liability. The question becomes particularly 
pertinent when it is realized that innocent injured third parties 
are not protected by the act at all, because of the inherent limita-
tions of the indemnity approach, if no liability for an incident 
is found. Failure to cover the no-liability case is explained by its 
considerable improbability and the expectation that Congress 
would act ad hoc in such a situation. (It should be noted here 
that the required private insurance must be broad enough to 
37 The AEC temporary regulation, 10 C.F,R. §140.11 (Supp. 1957), requires each 
licensee (excepting materials licensees) to have and maintain financial protection for 
each nuclear reactor in the amount of $150,000 per 1000 kilowatts of thermal energy 
capacity authorized in the license, provided that no reactor shall have less than $250,000. 
38 Sections 170(c), ll(r). 
39 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 
84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 116 (1956). 
40 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 17 (1957). 
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cover liability of all the "persons who may be liable," discussed 
above, before the Commission will permit an indemnity agree-
ment to be made.) 
Special coverage problems relating to the traditional im-
munity from suit of local governmental bodies and the federal 
government should be raised at this point. As to the former, 
the act authorizes the Commission to require waiver of such im-
munity as a condition to granting a license to operate a reactor.41 
(As a licensee, of course, the local body must secure private finan-
cial protection and execute an indemnity agreement.) Several 
dif6.culties42 can merely be mentioned in this regard, viz., wheth-
er immunity exists at all-raising the distinction between govern-
mental and proprietary functions; 43 whether the particular body 
has sufficient legislative and constitutional authority to waive it, 
and, if so, whether such a requirement on the part of the Com-
mission constitutes an unconstitutional condition.44 
As to the United States, the committee hearings indicate a 
general assumption that the Federal Government would not be-
come liable.45 The possibility does arise, however, under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act46 which permits suit in tort cases where a 
private person under the same circumstances would be liable. 
There are a number of exceptions to this, the most relevant to 
the present problem being " ... an act or omission of an employee 
of the Government . . . in execution of a statute or regula-
tion . . . based upon the exercise or performance or failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty . . . whether 
or not the discretion involved be abused. "47 This limitation re-
ceived a broad construction in Dalehite v. United States,48 in 
which the United States Supreme Court held that decisions relat-
ing to the technical conditions under which certain fertilizer 
was packaged involved governmental discretion. A subsequent 
decision of the Supreme Court, however, has given greater recog-
41 Section 170(a). The provision is not mandatory. 
42 The Commission is now studying these problems, BNA, ATOMIC INDUSTRY 
REP. 3:31 (1957). 
43 CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 107-108 (1952). 
44 See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. I (1910); Frost 8: Frost Truck-
ing Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 271 U.S. 583 (1926). 
45 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 
84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 73, 74 (1956). 
46 28 U.S.C. (1952) §§1346, 2671 to 2680. 
47 Id., §1346(a). 
48 346 U.S. 15 (1953). 
1958] COMMENTS 759 
nition to the distinction between the use of governmental discre-
tion to undertake a given activity -and the relatively mechanical 
aspects of carrying it out.49 Two recent district court decisions 
have evidenced a conflicting approach as to how far the exercise 
of discretion extends in the process of testing atomic weapons.50 
These cases indicate generally that if, e.g., the alleged negligence 
of a federal employee is in the determination of safety standards, 
rather than their proper administration, the government will 
escape liability. 
Should the government be found liable, however, its relation-
ship to the Anderson Amendment is somewhat unclear. As the 
operator of a reactor, the government can probably be presumed 
not to have made an agreement with itself, so that its liability is 
not limited. If its liability is in connection with another's agree-
ment (an Air Force plane crashes into a covered reactor) the 
liability limitation might apply. The question would turn on 
whether the government is a "person(s)" within the provision 
of section 170(e) that the "aggregate liability for a single nuclear 
incident of persons indemnified . . . shall not exceed the sum of 
$500,000,000 .... " 
II. Protection: Persons Entitled To Recover 
While the act's protection of the public is broad, it is not un-
limited. Section 17 0( c) provides that a "contract of indemnity 
shall cover public liability arising out of or in connection with 
the licensed activity." This language obviously includes any in-
cident which occurs on the site of the licensed activity, and the 
Committee Report specifically includes any mishap that may 
arise while radioactive materials are being transported to or from 
that site. 51 Does the phrase "in connection with the licensed 
activity" embrace an incident which occurs at the plant of the 
fuel elements fabricator or re-processor? While such an inclusion 
49 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); 5 J. PUB. L. 258 (1957). 
cm Bulloch v. United States, (D.C. Utah 1956) 145 F. Supp. 824, noted in 35 TEXAS 
L. REV. 590 (1957); and Bartholomae Corp. v. United States, (S.D. Cal. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 
651, noted in 5 J. PUB. L. 258 (1956). Both cases denied recovery, but the latter on 
grounds that the question of taking certain precautions prior to testing involved govern• 
mental discretion, while the former insisted that actual carrying out of the tests is 
ministerial and requires the exercise of due care, recovery being denied for failure to 
prove causation. The Bartholomae case also rejected a theory that the damage involved 
a taking which requires compensation under the Fifth Amendment, the essence of the 
claim being in tort. 
51 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 18 (1957). 
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appears reasonable, can the language be further extended to cover 
an accident occurring in one of these independent plants arising 
out of work done for another customer (which has no indemnity 
agreement) but which is aggravated by fissionable materials on 
hand for use in the indemnified reactor? To state such questions is 
to emphasize that they are a matter of degree and must be deter-
mined on their facts as they arise. 
Another limitation on the act's protection is the geographic 
requirement that the nuclear. incident must occur "within the 
United States."52 This clearly excludes any nuclear incident 
abroad, whether it caused injury within the United States or 
liability to a United States citizen, e.g., an exporter.53 The latter 
situation is particularly important in view of the fact that the 
first real demand for reactors will be in other countries, rather 
than in the United States with its relative abundance of fossil 
fuels.54 Indemnity legislation is probably not the best answer to 
this problem which the Joint Committee preferred to handle 
through international agreements,55 but dependence on individ-
ual agreements following diplomatic negotiation is not conducive 
to the most rapid development of a market for American built 
reactors. 
Less clear is the case of an incident occurring within the 
United States which causes damage abroad (e.g., Canada or 
Mexico) with resulting liability of the indemnitee. The Commit-
tee Report indicates that such a case would not be covered, group-
ing it with the foregoing situations as problems that "will require 
further investigation by the Congress at that time."56 Such an 
interpretation is difficult to square with the language of the act 
which simply states that the "nuclear incident" must be within 
the United States.57 The Report is careful to point out in another 
connection that the site of a nuclear incident is "that event at 
the site of the ... activity . . . rather than the site where the dam-
age may perhaps be caused."58 Moreover, the act states that in-
52 Section 170(0). 
53 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16 (1957). 
54 Wit, "Some International Aspects of Atomic Power Development," 21 LAw AND 
CONTEM. PROB. 148 (1956). 
55 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity 
and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 13, 14 (1957); ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC., 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST ATOMIC liAzARDs 60, 61 (1957). 
56 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16 (1957). 
57 Section ll(o). 
58 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16 (1957). 
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demnitees are to be indemnified for "any legal liability arising 
out of, or resulting from, a nuclear incident,"59 although the 
Report indicates that "any" was used only to remove all time 
restrictions on claims. 60 The desirability of using this broad word 
for so narrow a purpose can be questioned, and the construction 
of the section will ultimately turn on whether a court will let 
the legislative history control the relatively plain meaning of the 
statute.61 
The act is quite liberal in covering all kinds of damage, 62 and 
it should be noted that protection is not confined to losses for 
which legal liability is found. That is, even property owned by 
one held liable in connection with an incident, if located off the 
site of the reactor, is protected provided it is also covered by the 
financial protection furnished by the licensee.63 This is impor-
tant, for the risk of loss caused by a nuclear calamity is excluded 
from all insurance policies save those covering the nuclear activity 
itself.64 Nuclear liability policies, however, cover the operator's 
off-site property and the governmental indemnity adds needed 
depth to his protection. Since all other persons are covered by the 
government indemnity as well as the operator's financial protec-
tion, if the operator's off-site property were not included, lie 
would be protected to a lesser extent than everyone else with 
respect to off-site· property.65 This inclusion in the act was prompt-
ed by the plight of colleges operating small research reactors in 
proximity to the main campus,66 although the act's language is 
not confined to the college reactor situation. It covers the com-
mercial operator in the same manner, no differentiation being 
made because the non-nuclear insurance problem is the same. 
In addition to actual present damage, indemnity will also be 
paid on claims for the loss of use of property.67 This could mean, 
59 Section ll(u). Emphasis added. 
60 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16 (1957). 
61 Cf. generally ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC., FINANCIAL PROTECI1ON AGAINST 
ATOMIC HAzARDs 61 (1957). 
62 Section ll(o). 
63 Sections ll(u), 170(c). 
64 In order to avoid pyramiding of claims, the insurance organizations have excluded 
nuclear risks from all policies except those covering on-site personnel and property and 
liability, the latter being intended to cover the risks excluded from all the other policies. 
Hence, the manner in which the federal indemnity is drawn, S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 
1st sess., p. I 7 (1957). 
65 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 18 (1957). 
66Ibid. 
61 Section ll(o). 
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in the event total damages exceed the aggregate limit on liability 
so as to require apportionment, that lost profits of the operator 
due to destruction of his off-site property would be allowed to 
dilute the personal in jury claims of innocent third parties. The 
wisdom of including such relatively speculative damages when a 
ceiling is imposed on total liability appears questionable in view 
of the absence of any priority scheme in the act. 
Finally, three relatively narrow exceptions to the kind of 
losses covered by the act should be noted: "claims arising out of 
an act of war," damage to property of persons indemnified which 
"is located at the site of and used in connection with the activity 
where the nuclear incident occurs," and "claims under State or 
Federal Workmen's Compensation Acts of employees of persons 
indemnified who are employed at the site of and in connection 
with activity where · the nuclear incident occurs."68 The reason 
for the first exception is plain, and the latter two were established 
because separate insurance policies adequately cover such losses. 69 
While the phrase in these latter two exceptions, "in connection 
with the activity," might cause interpretative problems, when 
construed in the light of the reason for the exceptions, persons 
not covered by separate insurance are probably covered by the 
act. 
III. Financial Protection Required 
Although, as has already been observed, the coverage of the 
act extends to all persons who may incur liability in connection 
with a nuclear incident, the only persons who pay for this benefit 
are the licensee (and possibly a contractor) with whom the in-
demnity agreement is executed and the government; the others 
pay nothing. The amount of financial protection required of these 
licensees is the "amount of liability insurance available from pri-
vate sources except that the Commission may require a lesser 
amount" taking into consideration such factors as (1) the cost 
and terms of private insurance, (2) the type, size and location of 
the licensed activity and other factors pertaining to the hazard, 
and (3) the nature and purpose of the licensed activity.70 These 
exceptions were allowed to permit the Commission to consider 
the degree of hazard and the economics of an activity, and to 
68 Section ll(u). 
69 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. I 7, 18 (1957); Stanley and Simmons, "Financial 
Protection for the Atomic Energy Industry," 45 GEO. L. J. 587 at 589, 590 (1957). 
70 S.ection I70(b). 
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provide a possible inducement for non-profit research reactors 
by requiring little private protection. 71 
However, in the case of facilities "designed for producing sub-
stantial amounts of electricity and having a rated capacity of 100,-
000 electrical kilowatts or more, the amount of financial protec-
tion required shall be the maximum amount available from pri-
vate sources."72 If private insurance should become available in 
substantially greater amounts, premium charges could become so 
burdensome that it would be financially impossible to operate 
such a reactor. Such circumstances would result in the same gen-
eral kind of problem that the indemnity legislation was designed 
to overcome in the first place, i.e., a financial barrier to private 
atomic enterprise development associated with the contingency of 
liability to third parties.73 The provision in question appears to 
represent a feeling that the potentially most dangerous facilities 
should, in order to maximize public protection, be given the 
least financial incentives.74 The appropriateness of the above 
limitation to achieve that policy seems dubious, however, since 
the inhibiting factor is geared to the amount of insurance avail-
able rather than the extent of the hazard. To illustrate, if the 
amount of insurance available remains limited, a reactor could be 
profitably operated on the outskirts of New York City, while if an 
unlimited amount of insurance should ultimately become avail-
able, it would become unprofitable to operate a reactor even in 
a sparsely settled area because of the large premium outlay. 
Although the financial protection required of licensees is 
measured in terms of available insurance, this protection may be 
furnished by "private insurance, private contractual indemnities, 
self insurance, other proof of financial responsibility, or a com-
bination of such measures."75 Any plan that involves reliance on 
the licensee's own assets raises a number of troublesome problems. 
A preliminary consideration, which the AEC must take into 
account in determining the adequacy of such protection, is the 
71 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 19 (1957). 
72Section 170(b). 
78 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 
84th Cong., 2d s=., pp. 1-3 (1956). 
74103 CONG. REc. 9554-9555 (July 1, 1957). Representative Cole stated: "The Joint 
Committee thinks it is quite proper that these large reactors operators should be required 
as a matter of law to get the maximum amount of insurance that is available, whether 
it is $20 million or •.• $200 million. They must go out and buy and pay out of their 
own resources the coverage in the greatest amount that is available to them." Id. at 9563. 
75 Section 170(b). 
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possible effect of a nuclear incident on these assets. The incident 
might cause extensive damage to off-site property that may not 
be compensated in full if claims exceed the aggregate limit on 
liability, and which the licensee itself would have to make good 
from undamaged assets. Moreover, many companies rely on their 
assets to meet workmen's compensation claims, and the conse-
quences of a nuclear incident could be severe in this regard.76 
Other problems can be suggested. Since, as previously indi-
cated, private financial protection must cover everyone who might 
become liable, the Commission must decide how the licensee or 
contractor can show coverage of its suppliers, to say nothing of 
possible trespassers. This problem becomes extraordinarily com-
plex when it is realized that such trespassers, who must be cov-
ered by indemnitee's financial protection, may also be liable to 
the indemnitee.77 
IV. Limitation on Liability 
Although repeatedly urged to recommend an open end in-
demnity, the Joint Committee did not do so for two major rea-
sons. In the first place, an unlimited commitment of public funds 
would have been extremely difficult to get through Congress,78 
which undoubtedly had a considerable impact on the second con-
sideration, viz., that Congress is generally disposed to wait and 
deal with any disaster situation on an ad hoc basis. This philoso-
phy is reflected in the frequently iterated suggestion that Congress 
can appropriate additional funds should the ceiling on liability 
be reached. 79 While adopting the aggregate limitation, Congress 
rejected a ceiling on individual claims, such as was employed in 
connection with the Texas City disaster.80 Such a limitation might 
76 See remarks of Sen. Anderson, Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy, Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 22, 23 (1957). 
77 BNA, ATOMIC INDUSTRY REP. 3:371 (1957). 
78 "In suggesting $500 million, I was trying ,to see if we could not get some figure 
which would not frighten the country or the Congress to death and still solve the prob-
lem which the producers of parts face, and which the fabricator of the entire reactor 
faces, and which the operator of that reactor would eventually face once he puts it in 
operation." Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic :Energy, Governmental In-
demnity, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 53 (1956). · 
79 103 CONG. REc. 13724 (Aug. 16, 1957). 
so Fertilizer being shipped overseas by the Federal Government caught fire and ex-
ploded while being loaded, causing enormous loss of life and property in Texas City. 
The facts are set forth .in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), which held that 
the Federal Tort Claims Act did not permit suit against the government under the 
circumstances. Congress subsequently appropriated funds for the compensation of claim-
ants, with a $25,000 ceiling on individual claims, on August 10, 1955. 69 Stat. 707, c. 864. 
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deprive a few seriously injured plaintiffs of adequate compensa-
tion, whereas Congress can benefit the larger numbers affected by 
the aggregate ceiling with an additional appropriation. 
Since the act serves to limit recovery on judgments validly ob-
tained under state law, its constitutionality under the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment must be considered. Courts have 
dealt with both state and federal cases involving limitations on 
liability and have frequently upheld such legislation by finding 
that a valuable right was granted in return for the right given 
up. Thus, in the federal area the Warsaw Convention placing an 
upper limit on recovery in air disasters has been upheld since 
plaintiff need no longer prove negligence.81 Similarly the United 
States Supreme Court has upheld state workmen's compensation 
statutes limiting recovery since the employer was made absolutely 
liable. 82 The Anderson Amendment could be brought within 
the principle of these cases by arguing that in return for the limi-
tation on defendant's liability, Congress has substituted a $500 
million plus fund, which can reasonably be assumed to be larger 
than the available asset pool of most reactor operators, or at least 
a fair substitute therefor. Moreover, to the extent that assump-
tion is correct, the denial of due process becomes illusory. 
An even larger number of cases, however, can be found where 
liability was limited without any apparent grant of substitute 
rights. In the federal area the liability of shipowners has been 
limited under the admiralty power;83 liability is constitutionally 
cut off in the Bankruptcy Act;84 and Congress has abolished ret-
roactively causes of action for portal-to-portal pay within the 
limits of due process, although that case is distinguishable be-
cause the causes also rested on rights that existed only by virtue 
of a federal statute.85 The Supreme Court's theory in such cases 
appears to be that the limitation was a reasonable and appropriate 
exercise of substantive powers granted Congress;86 it cannot be 
81 Warsaw Convention on International Air Transportation, 49 Stat. 3019 (eff. Oct. 
29, 1934). Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, (D.C. N.J. 1957) 152 F. Supp. 486. See Pickens, 
"Actions Arising Out of Airplane -Mishaps," 42 IowA L. REv. 479 at 503-507 (1957). 
82New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916). 
83 U.S. Rev. Stat. §4283 (1875), as amended 46 U.S.C. (1952) §183; In re Garnett, 141 
U.S. 1 (1891). 
84 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 15 (1957). 
85 See cases cited in 29 U.S.C.A. (1956) §251. See also, :Brown, "Vested Rights and 
the Portal to Portal Act," 46 MICH. L. REv. 723 (1948). 
SBSee, e.g., In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1 (1891); Second Employers Liability Cases, 223 
U.S. I (1912), where the Court used this argument, inter alia, in sustaining congressional 
legislation which enlarged .the liability of interstate carriers. 
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doubted that there are substantive powers to justify federal atomic 
energy regulation.87 
Fourteenth Amendment and state cases also provide fruitful 
analogies. The Supreme Court recently dismissed a due process 
objection to a California statute limiting recovery in libel suits 
against newspapers and radio stations to special damages unless 
retraction be demanded and refused, for want of a substantial 
federal question.88 State statutes limiting liability for airplane, 
accidents have been upheld.89 The generally unquestioned as-
sumption that corporate liability is limited is not wholly irrele-
vant. The sweep of these cases cutting across many substantive 
areas seems rather conclusively to indicate that the act will be 
upheld. 
V. Problems of Administration 
The act wisely provides that "in administering the provisions 
of this section, the Commission shall use, to the maximum ex-
tent practicable, the facilities and services of private insurance 
organizations."90 These organizations, of course, will be reim-
bursed for their services, such expenses being charged to the fund: 
This provision has the practical advantage of avoiding needless 
duplication of machinery and may also serve to alleviate prob-
lems in the application of section l 70(h). That section provides 
that "when the Commission makes a determination that the United 
States will probably be required to make indemnity payments ... 
[it] shall collaborate with any person indemnified and may ap-
prove the payment of any claim under the agreement for indemni-
fication, appear through the Attorney General on behalf of the 
per~on indemnified, take charge of such action, and settle or de-
87 F.step, "Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Atomic 
Energy Activities," 52 MICH. L. R.Ev. 333 (1954). 
ss Jefferson v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 344 U.S. 803, rehearing den. 344 U.S. 882 
(1952). The Supreme Court also upheld Minnesota mortgage moratorium legislation 
as a reasonable exercise of the police ,power in Home Building and Loan Association v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED S:rATES OF AMERICA 
360 (1952). State courts have gone both ways on the constitutionality of such statutes; 
but where the statutes have been stricken down, a state constitutional provision assuring 
a remedy for libel has also been involved. California and other states have found neither 
that type provision nor the Fourteenth Amendment inconsistent with the Jegislation. See 
Werner v. Southern California etc. Newspapers, 35 Cal. (2d) 121, 216 P. (2d) 825 (1950), 
and annotation in 13 ALR. (2d) 277 (1952); 36 ORE. L. R.Ev. 70 (1956). 
89 Pickens, "Actions Arising Out of Airplane Mishaps," 42 IowA L. R.Ev. 479 at 486, 
487 (1957). 
90 Section 170(g). 
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fend any such action." (Emphasis added.) Since the "agreement 
for indemnification" does not appear to include the financial 
protection furnished by the licensee, 91 it is not clear at just what 
point claims may be administered by the Commission as opposed 
to the private insurer.92 This is unfortunate for whenever dam-
ages reach the point where both private and government indem-
nities are needed, no useful purpose is served by distinguishing 
which source is paying a particular claim. As indicated ear-
lier in this paragraph, to the extent the commission utilizes the 
private insurer as its agent in handling claims under section 
l 70(g), this problem may be circumvented. 
More serious problems will arise should apportionment of 
claims become necessary. While the Texas City disaster provided 
some useful experience in this area, it can hardly serve as prece-
dent for administration of the act. There Congress simply ap-
pointed the Secretary of the Army to administer payments and 
imposed a ceiling of $25,000 on individual claims.93 This proce-
dure was facilitated by the fact that the funds were not in dis-
charge of any legal obligation on the part of the government, 
that question already having been resolved in the government's 
favor.94 In addition, Congress had only to deal with a single geo-
graphically isolated disaster, the specific facts of which were read-
ily available. Thus Congress did not have to rely on subsequent 
fact findings to determine whether payments need be limited. 
Section 170(e) of the.act deals with these problems and pro-
vides as follows: 
"The Commission or any person indemnified may apply 
to the appropriate district court of the United States having 
venue in bankruptcy matters over the location of the nuclear 
incident, and upon a showing that the public liability from a 
single nuclear incident will probably exceed the limit of 
liability ... , shall be entitled to such orders as may be appro-
priate for the enforcement of the provisions of this section, 
including an order limiting liability of the persons indemni-
fied, orders staying the payment of claims and the execution 
of court judgments, orders permitting partial payments to 
g1 Section 170(d) gives the commission discretionary power to require financial protec• 
tion in addition to its existing authority to indemnify its contractors. 
92 71 HARV. L. R.Ev. 750 at 753 (1958). 
oa 69 Stat. 707, c. 864, August 10, 1955. 
g4 See note 80 supra. 
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be made before final determination of the total claims, and 
an order setting aside a part of the funds available for pos-
sible latent injuries not discovered until a later time."95 
The section sets venue as the site of the nuclear incident, that is, 
where the mishap takes place rather than where damage is in-
curred.96 Individual claimants, however, may sue a defendant in 
any state where process may be served and property of the de-
fendant remains subject to attachment.97 
Perhaps the most difficult problems raised by the section con-
cern the handling of latent injuries. An estimate of their probable 
extent should be included in determining whether total claims 
will exceed the limit on liability.98 It is therefore possible that 
immediate claims will not be satisfied in full even if they do not 
exceed the limit. Once the reserve for latent injuries is set aside, 
further difficulties may be expected when the first claims are pre-
sented. To what extent can they be satisfied? And how long should 
the fund be maintained? The proper disposition of whatever may 
remain in the reserve on its termination presents still another 
unanswered question. Since the indemnity legislation does not 
substantively affect liability, state statutes of limitations are still 
a bar; yet the Committee Report indicated that it intended no 
time limit on filing claims.98a Perhaps the peculiar characteristics 
of radiation injuries may lead to corresponding adjustments in 
this regard. All these considerations indicate that it will make a 
difference to claimants whether they are paid out of the funds 
available for immediate distribution or out of the reserve, yet 
the act provides no time limit within which the first category of 
claims must be filed. These many determinations will ultimately 
devolve upon the federal district courts. 
Section 170(e) of the act suggests as a solution to these prob-
lems the use of a device akin to the equity receivership.99 This 
95 Section I 70(e). 
96 S. Rep. 296, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 22 (1957). 
97 At least until and unless the appropriate federal district cour.t issues an order as 
provided in §170(e). 
98 The act provides only that a reserve is to be set aside when describing the proce-
dure for apportionment. -In view of the policy of the act not to limit protection by time, 
"claims" as that word is used in §170(e) to describe the conditions for a petition for 
apportionment should include an estimate of latent injuries. 
98a Note 60 supra. 
99 Federal district courts are authorized to appoint receivers for property situated 
in different districts. 28 U.S.C. (1952) §§754, 959, 1692. 
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would require that all suits be brought against a receiver in a 
single court. Aside from providing highly desirable uniformity 
in the measurement of damages, 100 claims could be so co-ordinated 
as to enable fair and workable apportionment. In addition, by 
eliminating duplicative proof of the facts of a single incident, 
depletion of the indemnity fund as a result of the expense of 
litigation would be minimized. Moreover, by placing all of de-
fendant's assets under the control of a federal district court and 
thereby eliminating the danger of obstructing attachments, the 
defendant's business may be maintained as a "going concern." 
A Connecticut court employed this device with considerable suc-
cess in connection with the Ringling Brothers fire of 1944.101 
With outstanding claims approximated at $15 million,102 Ringling 
Brothers submitted to voluntary receivership. All claims were 
determined by arbitration under an agreement by which Ring-
ling Brothers did not contest liability. So enabled to continue 
in business, Ringling Brothers paid off its obligations out of 
earnings during the next six years. 
Arguably, the use of the equity receivership will result in the 
additional advantage of a single period of limitations in the ad-
ministration of all claims connected with a single incident. This 
result may be reached on any one of three different theories. The 
proceedings being equitable in nature, a court would be justified 
in applying the doctrine of !aches and disregarding state statutes of 
limitations. Alternatively, regarding jurisdiction as based upon 
federal question, resort may be had to a single federal period of 
limitation. On the other hand, assuming jurisdiction would have 
to be founded upon diversity of citizenship, compelling resort 
to state law, traditional conflicts doctrine generally classifies 
statutes of limitation as procedural, 103 so that the lex fori would 
control in all cases. While it is recognized that the advantages of 
the equity receivership are somewhat lessened by the appoint-
ment of ancillary receivers in other states, it may reasonably be 
assumed that nuclear reactors will be separately incorporated and 
the defendant's assets located in a single state. 
100 Tihe greatest degree of uniformity would be achieved were the proceedings con-
ceived of as equitable in nature. In this situation, ·there would be no requirement of 
a jury and all claims would ,be tried before the same judge. 
101 Jacobs v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum and Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 141 Conn. 
86, 103 A. (2d) 805 (1954); 60 YALE L. J. 1417 (1951). 
102Ibid. 
103 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., 240 (1949). 
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Conclusion 
The primary purpose of the indemnity amendments, to en-
courage private enterprise in the atomic energy field by providing 
protection from the danger of financial ruin104 accompanying a 
nuclear disaster, appears to have been accomplished.105 The legis-
lation is also to be commended for measures designed to prevent 
serious accidents106 and in providing greater financial protection 
to the public than has heretofore existed. But, the serious short-
comings of the legislation in its present form are not to be over-
looked. The limited character of the protection, particularly in 
view of failure to adopt a scale of priority, could result in serious 
inequities. In addition, the decision not to impose strict liability 
in conjunction with the indemnity makes possible unnecessary 
litigation at the expense of both indemnitors and claimants. More-
over, the failure to supply adequate administrative machinery is 
apt to present real difficulties, particularly in those cases where 
apportionment of claims becomes necessary. These problems can 
in large measure be alleviated by ad hoc congressional appropria-
tions, and resort to the equity receivership. 
Dudley H. Chapman, S.Ed. 
104' The philosophy underlying the act has .been described as being to protect industry, 
not the public, the latter to be accommodated by ad hoc appropriations. Hearings Before 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 
pp. 38, 39 (1956). 
105 Donovan, "Insurance Problems Crea.ted by the Peacetime Use of Atomic Energy,'' 
INS. L. J. 623 (Oct. 1957). 
106 Section 29 formally establishes the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 
a body which has already exercised its function of making safety recommendations with 
regard to specific license applications, on an informal basis. Sec. 170(i) calls for a Com-
mission survey following any nuclear incident that will probably require payments under 
the government indemnity to determine its causes, the findings to be made public. 
